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As far as distributive justice is concerned, an important issue is to know whether
the different principles by which a given distribution of goods is judged fair or
unfair are exclusive or complementary. The European Values Survey carried out
in 1999 shows clearly the priorities of Europeans in this matter. The first concerns
the guarantee that ‘basic needs are met for all’, then comes ‘recognizing people on
their merits’ and finally ‘eliminating big inequalities in income’. The consensus on
this hierarchy is not altered by national, demographical, social, economic or
political divisions. These different divisions do indeed influence opinions on each
criterion, but, with very few exceptions, they are not sufficient to upset this order
of priorities. Thus, the usual applied principles of distributive justice do not define
competing spheres. Their nested (or ‘lexical’) order is compatible with the purely
procedural condition of ‘equal liberty’.
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Introduction
The aim of distributive justice is to resolve conflicts over how a set of goods should
be shared out between individuals. The intention may always be the same  to find
impartial procedures or good rules to ensure a fair distribution  but the many
theoretical and empirical works that explore this question emphasize the diversity of
criteria considered to be legitimate, depending on the nature and context of the
conflicts under consideration. Even if we limit ourselves solely to modern societies,
three different criteria for justice stand out clearly in these studies: absolute equality,
equity  which introduces relative equality, in that it aims to reward people on the
basis of their unequal individual merits  and the satisfaction of needs, or at least of
basic needs. At first view, these criteria seem to define spheres of justice that are
heterogeneous, incompatible or in competition with each other.
Such an incompatibility raises both an empirical and a theoretical question. The
first is quite simple: is it so certain that, in people’s view, these criteria cannot be
combined? The second issue concerns any Kantian theory of social justice. If the
criteria of what is just define local spheres (Walzer 1983, Elster 1992), because they
are valid here but not elsewhere, for some people but not for others, at the present
time but not earlier or later, and so on, then it is certainly difficult to maintain that
social justice forms a whole, characterized by its unity and universality. In short, we
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are faced with a very clear-cut choice between two exclusive options. Either, as the
champions of relativism would have it, justice is fundamentally local and the
diversity of the empirical criteria of what is just is an expression of legitimate but
essentially incompatible claims; or these criteria, particularly those which interest us
here, can be ordered into a coherent whole by very reason of the unique and purely
procedural foundation on which they are based.
From this standpoint, the European Values Survey (EVS) provides a precious
database for analysis, as in 1999, in all the 26 countries that make up the Union
(except Cyprus where the survey was not conducted), it included three questions
corresponding to the criteria mentioned. Using these data, we shall set out to prove
four hypotheses, with the aim of validating the second of the two options just
described. First, we must show that the different criteria for distributive justice
enjoy a certain consensus. Strong dissension would render them quite incompatible.
Moreover, the consensus must be accompanied by positive correlations between
these criteria. If the correlations were negative, this would mean that even in the
case of massive agreement about each one taken separately, they would be in a
conflict of legitimacy with each other. They would be deemed important but
competing. Third, we must establish that Europeans consider these criteria to be
ordered into a clear hierarchy. Lastly, this hierarchy must itself enjoy a clear
consensus, especially in transcending national, social, demographic, economic,
ideological or political divisions. In other words, although it is clearly to be
expected that these divisions should lead to different opinions about distributive
justice, they must not significantly alter the order of priorities expressed in this
hierarchy, if the second alternative is to be fully validated. To give just one example:
it is quite likely that the least favoured will attach more importance to real equality
and that the most well-off will attach more importance to the recognition of merit,
but for all that, they must not disagree too strongly about the prioritization of these
principles.
Need, equity, equality
From a unique foundation to the prioritization of applications
Before we get down to examining these criteria of distributive justice within the
specific context of the 1999 EVS, it seems important to give some more details of the
epistemological orientation that we shall follow.
The diversity of principles governing distributive justice needs little argumenta-
tion; it is enough simply to observe it. As far back as we care to look, men and
women have sought to define procedures to settle conflicts over the sharing-out of
goods (Moessinger 1998). Yet, this multitude of empirical solutions is not necessarily
in contradiction with the idea that they can lie on the same foundation directing
individuals’ choices towards one or another concrete solution. It is simply that this
foundation is applied differently in different contexts; it comes in different forms
according to the priorities inherent in the situation. There is nothing surprising
about this. The idea that the freedom of one person stops where the freedom of
others begins, far from resolving the question of social justice, brings it into a real
empirical situation, because the debate about the fair limit between different
individuals’ freedoms can only be pursued on the basis of concrete considerations.
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In other words, the just solution to a conflict between different people’s ends always
consists in defining a rule that is reasonable for everyone, precisely because it
guarantees the coexistence of different ends. Essentially, the moral deliberation
revolves around this coexistence; it seeks to apply the principle of ideal unanimous
agreement in the facts by setting out the different possibilities which could or should
be realized, and those which should not because, being unreasonable, they deny this
coexistence of ends. Under these conditions, the solutions applied necessarily vary
according to the circumstances, the interpretation of reality, the possibilities or the
understanding of aspirations. So, if the substantial solutions appear diverse, this in
no way means that they cannot derive from the same formal principle: Kant’s
categorical imperative (1785) or principle of universalization and generalization,
Rawls’s pure procedural justice or principle of equal liberty (1971), the principle of
discussion of Habermas (1991) and Apel (1988) or justice as unanimous agreement
(Forse´ and Parodi 2005); in any case, we should note in passing, these formulations
are largely equivalent.
Furthermore, the rules that have been proposed to define a given distribution,
particularly those we shall examine in this article (equity, equality, the satisfaction
of basic needs), all have arguments in their favour, so it would be quite insufficient
to say that the appropriate rule is determined entirely by the circumstances.
Separately, they present no grounds for absolute rejection, because there is nothing
a priori unreasonable about them. They are not a priori in contradiction with a
principle of universalization  whatever the name given to this founding principle.
This is why they may present themselves as lying on solid reasons, from this very
perspective of what is reasonable or just. If so, there are, finally, only two
possibilities. Either they are considered as incompatible, putting an abrupt end to
the debate about social justice as a coherent whole. Or they can be made
compatible through a process of prioritization. In this case, certain claims must be
satisfied as a priority, and only when this has been done can we move on to the
following. Rawls (1971, §23, p. 115) saw this point most clearly: ‘A conception of
right must impose an ordering on conflicting claims. This requirement springs
directly from the roles of its principles in adjusting competing demands.’ Amartya
Sen (1992) also stressed the importance of an ordering, leading him to broaden the
concept of utilitarianism by framing the maximization of an end within a hierarchy
of ends.1
Starting from this idea of ordering, two avenues remain open to research. While
accepting this gradation, the first approach contents itself with situating the concrete
positions of citizens and evaluating the balance of power. The second, which we
adopt here, seeks to go further. Remembering the opening of a Kantian theory of
justice to public reason, it seeks to contribute to an empirical theory2 of what is just
which takes into account the opinions voiced by citizens about reasonable priorities
in terms of justice. Although this can be applied to social justice in general (which,
besides distributive or economic justice, also concerns retributive justice on the one
hand and procedural justice on the other), we shall restrict ourselves here to the
domain of distributive justice and more particularly to the rules that predominate
today.
Of course, the purpose of such an empirical theory is not to validate a normative
frame by the means of some empirical findings. It would be a nonsense to say that
Kant or Rawls or any other philosophers of the same vein are right because of
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empirical results showing the popularity of such or such aspect of their theory. The
popularity of some principles of justice is not a sufficient indicator of the fact that
they indeed are principles of justice. Nonetheless, if a Kantian approach to justice
has an a priori formal or procedural foundation, it also has empirical implications
concerning the necessary substantial applications of this foundation. The purpose
here is then to test whether some of these empirical implications, such as an ordering
of the criteria of need, equity and equality, correspond to an empirical reality. If so, it
means that such an empirical implication is not incompatible with what people
think.
From theories of equity to more multidimensional theories
As far as theories of distributive justice are concerned, we have moved on from a
situation where, from the time of Aristotle (Nichomachean ethics, book V), equity
constituted the sole, or the most complete, model for a situation where at least two
other models are now considered to be just as significant. Works in the field of social
psychology have played an important role in this change. Within the same discipline,
equity has often represented the principal criterion to be satisfied (Adams 1965,
Homans 1974). Here, distributive justice consists in verifying that, in one concrete
way or another, distribution respects a criterion of relative equality between the
contributions and rewards of each person, in other words that the merits of each
individual are recognized and remunerated proportionately. Numerous works have
been carried out (Tyler et al. 1997) from this perspective, with some notable
successes. They have, for example, established that when employees have a clear idea
about the fair wage for their work, those who are paid at this level are much more
satisfied than those who are underpaid, which goes without saying, but they are also
more satisfied than those who are overpaid, who feel a certain uneasiness about
being arbitrarily favoured in this way (Pritchard et al. 1972). Nevertheless, the limits
to the theory of equity soon become apparent when it comes to defining this fair
wage (Jasso 1980). Except for simple cases, the deserved payment is generally hard to
define. Moreover, individuals sometimes give their preference to other criteria,
depending on the circumstances.
Faced with these difficulties, and following numerous empirical studies, Morton
Deutsch (1975, 1985) developed a theory that synthesized the findings of research
into distributive justice in the field of social psychology. He questions the scope of
the theory of equity, while accepting that it represents the right solution in many
contexts. But as this is not always the case, he examines other criteria, specifying
the domains of relevance for each of them. We can in fact draw up a list of many
other criteria, such as real equality, need, ability, effort, efficiency, pleasure,
happiness, desire, etc. However, the studies in social psychology demonstrate that
three criteria suffice to resolve most conflicts over distribution, including the most
common. These three criteria are need, equality and merit. They appear to
constitute the principal domains of distributive justice. Although other principles
have been proposed, such as maximization of the sum of utilities (Bentham 1789)
or of average utility (Harsanyi 1977), the principle of difference (Rawls 1971) or
simple chance, these only appear to come afterwards, as specific means to
implement justice in one or another of these domains. At the same time, Deutsch
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relates each of these three criteria to a different type of human cooperation. His
thesis can be summed up as follows:
(i) In situations where economic productivity is the primary objective of
cooperation, merit is the dominant criterion of distributive justice.
(ii) In situations where the creation or maintenance of social relations for their
own sake is the primary objective, equality is the dominant criterion.
(iii) Finally, in situations where personal development and well-being are the
primary objective of cooperation, need is the dominant criterion.
It is worth noting that the analysis of Jennifer Hochschild (1981) is ultimately
quite similar, though not totally identical. Unlike Deutsch, she does not overlook
the question of procedures but, after analysing a large number of American
opinion polls conducted since the 1930s, she concludes that the principles of
distributive justice can be situated on a continuum bounded at one end by the
principle of (absolute) equality and at the other by a principle of differentiation
(equity). She distinguishes between three spheres of application. In the sphere of
social relations, equality prevails. In the economic sphere, equity prevails. The third
domain, that of politics, is intermediate, in that affirmation of the absolute
equality of rights can go hand in hand with acceptance of a fair and yet de facto
unequal distribution, though only under certain conditions, notably involving the
satisfaction of basic needs. Adopting a more theoretical approach, David Miller
(1999) also distinguishes these three criteria for distributive justice (desert or
equity, equality, needs).
However, as we were saying, one of the main attractions of Deutsch’s thesis is the
fact that it is based on a comprehensive survey of social psychological works. On a
descriptive level, therefore, it has many qualities. But we still do not know why these
principles of distribution are judged to be legitimate. We do not, therefore, possess
the means to understand why individuals sometimes decide that it would be fairer
not to share out a certain good in accordance with these principles. For example,
although friends often share the bill equally at the end of a meal in a restaurant
(according to (ii), when friendship is the objective, the principle of equality is
applied), they can also, in the name of this friendship, not share the bill on a strictly
equal footing when one of them has consumed significantly less than the others
(Konow 2003). Clearly, the order of magnitude comes into play here, and the type of
interaction is not sufficient to determine which criterion of distributive justice is
applied.
This problem is far from being simply anecdotal. Deutsch’s thesis, like that of
Hochschild and others, amounts primarily to considering distributive justice as a
simple means to shape an interaction. But why should justice simply be the means to
another end? Should it not, on the contrary, always be also an end? In any case, this
is clearly the opinion of Rawls (1971), who sets out on the very first page of A theory
of justice: ‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of
thought’. It is for this very reason that we must be able to relate an empirical
criterion to a procedural foundation. Otherwise, we cannot understand what founds
the legitimacy, nor explain why the empirical principle chosen is not always the one
dictated by the context. Indeed, under certain circumstances of this context, it may
no longer be considered legitimate, precisely because its application contravenes the
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foundation. Another principle must then be chosen. Moreover, despite the synthesis
achieved by Deutsch, distributive justice splits up into three principles which are, to a
large extent, exclusive. And yet, it is possible to bring them together into one unique
perspective if they correspond to an ordering or priorities. At least, we should
wonder whether such an ordering is compatible with public opinion. This is what we
shall now try to check, with the help of evidence drawn from the EVS.
European opinions about distributive justice
In 1999, as part of the European Values Survey, a question obviously inspired by
Deutsch’s theory was asked in every current European Union country. As far as we
know, the results concerning this particular question have hardly been exploited. The
question was put as follows:
In order to be considered ‘just’, what should a society provide? Please tell me for each
statement if it is important or unimportant to you. 1 means very important; 5 means not
important at all.
 Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens.
 Guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, clothes,
education, health.
 Recognizing people on their merits.
It should be noted that although the criteria chosen are indeed those of Deutsch,
the connection between criterion and type of interaction is not specified here. The
context chosen is very wide, embracing society as a whole. On the other hand, the
question clearly asks the interviewee to aim at justice. All in all, we possess enough
elements to provide an answer to the questions raised by Deutsch’s theory and, more
generally, to give a more precise picture of Europeans’ opinions about distributive
justice.
In relation to the four hypotheses that we wish to prove (see above), we shall start
by considering the levels of consensus and by wondering how these criteria are
correlated, i.e. whether they tend to be mutually exclusive or whether, on the
contrary, they tend to go together. We shall then examine the question of whether
there is a hierarchy between them, before moving on to study the variations in
answers according to different divisions along social, national or opinion-based lines,
in particular with a view to determining whether these variations are sufficient to
alter the hierarchy observed in the criteria of justice.
Strong consensus on the criteria for justice correlated with each other
All the results analysed in this study deal with the 26 countries that make up the
European Union (Cyprus excepted). In all, 31,541 individuals were interviewed3.
Table 1 presents the results for the three criteria for distributive justice proposed in
the survey. Clearly, these three criteria are considered important by a large
proportion of the population. First, the meeting of basic needs is massively
recognized as essential for a just society. Ninety per cent of European opinion is
concentrated on the top two levels of the scale (with 70% on the top level). Less
pronounced, but also judged to be very important, the recognition of merits was
placed on the top two levels by 80% of the interviewees (with 50% on the top level).
210 M. Forse´ and M. Parodi
Finally, eliminating big inequalities in income was also considered a criterion that
should be taken into account, but to a lesser extent than the others, as 65% of the
interviewees said it was important or very important, with fewer than half of them
(37%) judging it very important. Europeans felt themselves massively concerned by
these questions, as very few said it was impossible for them to answer (2% or 3%
according to the different criteria).
Beyond these consensuses, Europeans consider that these criteria are not
opposed to one another. On average, those who feel that one of the three criteria
is important for the construction of a just society also attach importance to the other
two. Guaranteeing that basic needs are met is closely connected to the reduction in
inequality (Pearson correlation r0.32) and, although less strongly, to the
recognition of merits (r0.26). The reduction of inequalities and the recognition
of merits are more weakly linked (r0.18), but the connection remains positive.
We did wonder whether equality and merit might nevertheless be opposed, once the
average importance attached to the criteria proposed in the survey had been taken
into account. But the partial correlation between equality and merit in relation to the
level of importance attached to the meeting of needs still remains positive (0.11).
This means that, contrary to a certain widely-held view, the values of equality and
the recognition of individual merits are not mutually exclusive, even if, out of the
three criteria, these are indeed the two with the weakest correlation.
A very clear nesting of priorities
These consensuses and correlations suggest that the different principles of
distributive justice can be combined, and even organized into a hierarchy. One
way to see whether such prioritization exists consists in examining the simplex these
criteria form when we dichotomize each of the corresponding scales. To do so, we
can either oppose the answers ‘important’ and ‘very important’ against the three
others, or oppose the answer ‘very important’ against the four others. We have, of
course, examined both these possibilities, but as the conclusions prove to be the same
(both here and later in terms of the Guttman scale), to simplify matters we shall only
present the results of the division by which answers 1 and 2 (recoded 1) are
contrasted with answers 3, 4 and 5 (recoded 0). As we now have only two possible
answers for each of the three criteria of justice, the simplex corresponding to their
combinatorial is a cube, on which is it easy to follow the most frequent path.
Table 1. The importance of the criteria of need, merit and equality for a society to be
considered ‘just’ (in %).
Need Merit Equality
Very important (1) 69.1 50.5 37.3
2 21.0 29.3 26.8
3 6.1 12.6 21.4
4 1.6 3.5 7.2
Not important at all (5) 0.6 1.7 4.1
Don’t know 1.6 2.3 3.1
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Starting from the situation where all these criteria are rejected (2.7% of the
sample), we can see in Figure 1, where this path is marked in bold, that when one
sole criterion is chosen, this is first and foremost the meeting of basic needs (5.8%).
Then, when two criteria are chosen but not the third, the most frequent combination
is that of basic needs and the recognition of merits (22.0%). Equality comes in third
place, only once these two criteria have already been chosen (54.8%).
To confirm this combinatorial, we can check whether it corresponds to a
(unidimensional) Guttman scale. Now, as Table 2 illustrates, with a threshold of
33%, we are indeed dealing with a Guttman scale. If only one of these criteria could
be chosen, it would be the criterion of meeting basic needs. If only two could be
chosen, they would be basic needs and the recognition of merits. As for the
reduction in inequalities, it is, as we have seen, the criterion that is the least cited of
100
(0.8%)
000 (2.7%)
110
(8.8%)
101 (1.7%)
010
(5.8%) 
011
(22.0%) 
001
(3.2%)
NeedEquality Merit
0
1
2
3
(n = 30,235)
111 (54.8%)
Figure 1. Simplex of the three criteria for distributive justice.
Table 2. Guttman scale of the three criteria for distributive justice (cumulated %).
Need Merit Equality
1 criterion 59% 33% 8%
2 criteria 95% 73% 32%
3 criteria 100% 100% 100%
Note: the variables are dichotomized by grouping answers 1 and 2 together on one side, 3, 4 and 5 on the
other.
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the three, but when it is considered important, this is very often under the condition
that the recognition of merits has already been chosen. Likewise, when the criterion
of merit is considered important, this is generally under the condition that the
meeting of basic needs has already been chosen. So Europeans do indeed construct
a hierarchy4 of the three criteria for building a just society. We can represent this
nesting using logical implications: Needs [ Merit [ Equality (the set Equality is
contained in the set Merit, which is itself contained in the set Needs).
To evaluate the weight of this hierarchy, all we need to do is to consider the
percentage of answers attaching equal or greater importance to the meeting of basic
needs compared to the recognition of merits, and, likewise, the percentage attaching
equal or greater importance to merit compared to the reduction of inequalities (on
the answer scale of 1 to 5). We can then see that 71% of Europeans observe this order
of priorities. It would not, therefore, be an exaggeration to say that the needsmerit
equality hierarchy meets with widespread support in Europe.
Moreover, the usual sociodemographic categories appear to have little influence
in determining this hierarchy. We shall come back to this point in more detail later;
for now, let us just note that whatever the sex, age (in four groups), occupation or
level of education, this order of priorities is adhered to by more than 65% of
individuals in the sociodemographic category under consideration. Variations are
never greater than a few percent. They are slightly higher when we consider the
different European countries, but the order revealed by the Guttman scale is always
the majority opinion (see Table 3).
This ordering of priorities transcends divisions into social, national or opinion-based
groups
This strong stability in the hierarchy can also be found by studying the average scores
for each criterion. Table 4 shows that need is once more the most important,
followed by merit and then equality.
To judge this stability in more detail, an analysis of variance of the different
principles according to the usual sociodemographic categories can be performed.
The Fisher F-test provides a good measurement of the discriminant nature of each
categorization as to its answers on need, merit or equality. The higher the value of F
for a given criterion, the more its importance depends on the categorization
concerned. And conversely, the closer this indicator is to zero, the less the answer
Table 3. Percentage of answers respecting the needsmeritequality hierarchy in the different
EU countries (in %).
Czech Rep. 57.4 Finland 66.2 United Kingdom 76.3
Italy 60.7 Greece 67.4 Romania 77.7
Estonia 61.5 France 68.2 Bulgaria 78.3
Lithuania 63.1 Luxembourg 69.2 Ireland 78.9
Denmark 64.0 Slovenia 69.4 Netherlands 79.8
Latvia 64.9 Sweden 71.2 Poland 80.0
Spain 65.3 Belgium 71.9 Hungary 80.8
Slovakia 65.4 Germany 72.1 Malta 84.0
Austria 66.1 Portugal 74.0
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depends of this categorization. Given the size of the sample (31,541), the average
scores are a pretty faithful reflection of the opinion of Europeans as a whole, and the
Fisher tests will in general be statistically significant. However, the most important
thing is to judge the importance of the F-tests on a sociological level, and from this
point of view it is more interesting to compare the F-values with each other.
Let us start with the gender category. Reading down the columns of Table 5, we
can see that European men and women attach the same importance to the
recognition of merits (the Fisher F-value being not even statistically significant),
but that men attach less importance to the reduction of inequalities or to the meeting
of basic needs, the gap in evaluation being slightly wider for the first of these two
criteria, according to the Fisher F-values. And yet, despite these significant
differences, when we read across the rows of Table 5, we can see that the hierarchy
of the three principles is not altered by gender. For men and women alike, the
prioritization in the average answers remains the same (needsmeritequality). Far
from being exceptional, this result will be repeated for almost all the different
divisions imaginable.
And so it is with age. All the age categories attach roughly the same importance
to the meeting of basic needs. The recognition of merits and the reduction of
inequalities, on the other hand, gain in importance with the age of the interviewees.
Despite these differences, however, the needsmeritequality hierarchy is identical for
all the age categories (the rows in Table 6 follow an invariable order).
The same holds true for the different levels of education (Table 7). There is little
divergence of opinion between these categories as to the meeting of basic needs. In
addition, the least-qualified interviewees only attached slightly more importance to
the recognition of merits. In fact, the main divergence concerns the reduction in
inequalities: the more highly qualified an individual is, the less importance he or she
attaches to this criterion. Nonetheless, the hierarchy of the three criteria (needs
meritequality) is once again the same, for every level of education.
Table 4. Averages and standard deviations of the criteria for distributive justice.
Average Standard deviation
Need 1.41 0.74
Merit 1.74 0.94
Equality 2.11 1.13
Note: As the answer scale goes in descending order from 1 for ‘very important’ to 5 for ‘not at all
important’, the lower the average score, the more important is the criterion.
Table 5. Averages and Fisher F-values of criteria for distributive justice by gender.
Need Merit Equality
Men 1.44 1.73 2.16
Women 1.38 1.74 2.07
Fisher F-value 52.8 1.7 (P  0.19) 55.5
Note: all the F-values presented in this paper are significant at the level of 1%, unless otherwise stated as
above for ‘merit’.
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The result is the same when we examine the different occupational categories
(Table 8). There is a certain consensus about meeting basic needs. As for the
recognition of merits, farmers consider it slightly more important, while the junior-
level non-manual office workers are the least attached to this second principle. As
before, opinions diverge more over the question of the reduction of inequalities. On
the one side, employers tend to diminish the importance of this principle. On the
other, manual workers and farmers show stronger support. But once again, reading
across the rows of Table 8, we can see that all the occupational categories adhere to
the same hierarchy of needsmeritequality.
This needsmeritequality hierarchy is therefore the same for all the social or
demographic categories examined: gender, age, occupation and level of education.
This is a quite remarkable result that cannot be emphasized too strongly.
Let us now turn to national differences. We have already noted that variations
here are of a greater magnitude. It is therefore more likely that this will have a
noticeable effect on the hierarchy within certain countries. When we carry out
analyses of variance for each criterion with the countries of the EU as our
independent variable, we can see that the Fisher F-values are 24.4 for need, 53.3 for
merit and 113.3 for equality. In other words, national opinions diverge most over the
importance that they attach to this last criterion. They diverge less over the
recognition of merits and even less over the meeting of basic needs. Principal
components analysis of the three criteria, with country as supplementary variable,
does not bring out any clear geographical or sociological groupings. Thus, Denmark
and the Czech Republic are distinguished by the low importance they attach to
meeting basic needs (with averages of 1.95 and 1.74 respectively). In all likelihood,
Table 7. Averages and Fisher F-values of criteria for distributive justice by level of education.
Need Merit Equality
Inadequately completed elementary education 1.37 1.65 1.77
Completed (compulsory) elementary education 1.42 1.72 1.98
(Compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational
qualification
1.38 1.66 1.95
Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification 1.43 1.76 2.09
Secondary, intermediate general qualification 1.47 1.84 2.10
Full secondary, maturity-level certificate 1.41 1.75 2.14
Higher education  lower-level tertiary certificate 1.35 1.79 2.35
Higher education  upper-level tertiary certificate 1.43 1.76 2.28
Fisher F-value 8.4 14.5 71.4
Table 6. Averages and Fisher F-values of criteria for distributive justice by age.
Need Merit Equality
1829 years old 1.39 1.83 2.19
3044 years old 1.40 1.79 2.19
4559 years old 1.42 1.68 2.05
Over 60 years old 1.43 1.64 2.02
Fisher F-value 3.8 66.0 47.1
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this is for different reasons, as these two countries have not experienced the same
historical trajectories and they do not satisfy these basic needs to the same extent
today. Greece (1.23), Latvia (1.24), Slovakia (1.26) and Hungary (1.28), on the other
hand, are distinguished by the high importance they attach to this principle.
Divergences over the recognition of merits are wider, as we have already remarked. In
the most extreme cases, Italy (1.97), Estonia (1.99), Denmark (2.13) and Lithuania
(2.24) show little interest in this criterion, whereas Romania (1.37), Poland (1.40),
Hungary (1.41) and the Czech Republic (1.45) consider it to be indispensable. The
divergences are even wider for the principle of reducing inequalities in income. To
give just the most extreme cases again, certain Southern countries, first among which
are Portugal (1.48) and Greece (1.61), attach great importance to this criterion, while
certain Northern countries (where these inequalities are less pronounced) 
particularly Sweden (2.69), the Netherlands (2.78) and Denmark (3.29)  display
much less concern about it. There are, therefore, indisputable variations in the
appraisal of the criteria of social justice from one country to another, but despite
these differences, the ‘needsmeritequality’ hierarchy remains practically unaltered
within each country. Only in the Czech Republic and Romania do the average scores
for the recognition of merits exceed the average scores for the meeting of basic needs.
And only Spain, Portugal, Greece, Latvia and Lithuania attach more importance to
the reduction of inequalities than to the recognition of merits. Apart from these
exceptions, which are both few and demographically very much in the minority, the
Table 8. Averages and Fisher F-values of criteria for distributive justice by occupational
categories.
Need Merit Equality
Farmer 1.40 1.57 1.93
Employer 1.49 1.71 2.44
Professional and manager 1.43 1.72 2.30
m.l. non-manual office worker 1.44 1.74 2.29
j.l. non-manual office worker 1.44 1.82 2.15
Manual worker 1.39 1.68 1.92
Fisher F-value 7.3 18.0 126.1
Note: m.l., middle-level; j.l., junior-level.
Table 9. Left-to-right political scale and distributive justice.
Need Merit Equality
Left (1) 1.28 1.80 1.64
(2) 1.34 1.80 1.98
(3) 1.43 1.72 2.18
(4) 1.56 1.75 2.48
Right (5) 1.52 1.61 2.37
Correlation (Pearson) 0.11 0.04 0.19
Note: correlation indicators that take into account the ordinal nature of the variables (Kendall, Spearman,
etc.) give similar results to those presented here.
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needsmeritequality order of priorities is endorsed in every country of the European
Union.
Political opinions have a similar effect. Using a scale of political self-positioning
from 1 (left) to 5 (right), we can see in Table 9 that although the recognition of merits
is less politically divisive than the other criteria, it is still supported more on the right
than on the left. The reduction of inequalities is more strongly affected by political
positioning (the correlation between the two scales being the strongest here). The
further to the left the interviewees, the more importance they attached to this
reduction. This is also true, to a lesser degree, for the principle of meeting basic
needs. Be that as it may, the ‘needsmeritequality’ hierarchy is not affected by
political position, except on the extreme left (position 1 in Table 9), where preference
is given to the ‘needsequalitymerit’ order of priority.
We conclude by turning our attention to economic opinions, where the diagnosis
turns out to be the same. Once again, we shall see that these opinions do not change
the ‘needsmeritequality’ order of priority. Here, we have chosen two questions. For
each one, the interviewees were asked to position themselves on a scale of opinion
ranging from 1 to 10. The first question contrasted the opinion ‘The state should give
more freedom to firms’ (1) with the opinion ‘The state should control firms more
effectively’ (10). The second contrasted ‘People who are unemployed should have
to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits’ (1) with ‘People
who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want’ (10).
To keep the tables a little simpler, we have grouped the replies together two by two
(as we also did for the political scale) to obtain a scale ranging simply from 1 (1
and 2) to 5 (9 and 10).
As Table 10 shows, the Europeans who express a moderate opinion about the
respective roles of the state and firms attach slightly less importance than the others
to the recognition of merits. The opinion about corporate freedom is more closely
linked to the principle of meeting basic needs. The more favourable interviewees were
to state control, the more they adhered to this principle. And this opinion is even
more closely linked to the importance attached to the reduction of inequalities, with
the state interventionists being more egalitarian than the liberals. However, these
divergences do not prevent the ‘needsmeritequality’ hierarchy from continuing to
prevail, whatever the degree of adherence to either economic liberalism or state
intervention. The links between the opinions on the right of unemployed people to
refuse jobs and the criteria of distributive justice are weaker. Europeans who favour
the granting of this right attach more importance to the meeting of basic needs and
to the reduction of inequalities in income. As for the recognition of merits, it appears,
Table 10. Averages of criteria of distributive justice according to opinions about the
economic role of the state.
Need Merit Equality
Freedom for firms (1) 1.51 1.65 2.40
(2) 1.48 1.82 2.29
(3) 1.42 1.80 2.11
(4) 1.38 1.79 2.00
State control (5) 1.26 1.56 1.75
Correlation (Pearson) 0.11 0.02 0.19
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once again, that those with moderate opinions tend to play down the importance of
this criterion. But the ‘needsmeritequality’ hierarchy persists; it is not modified by
opinions on the right of unemployed people to refuse jobs.
An ordering based on the purely procedural principle of equal liberty
Lexical ordering
This order we have just seen to prevail so persistently is no simple ‘hit parade’
juxtaposing the levels of support for the different criteria. The fact that there is
a unidimensional Guttman scale demonstrates, more fundamentally, that the
European consensus concerns the hierarchy itself. Deutsch’s three criteria are not
simple heterogeneous objectives, where embracing one means abandoning the others.
They are, on the contrary, nested: the vast majority of Europeans support not simply
the criteria of need, merit and equality, but the lexical ordering of all three.
According to Rawls’s definition (1971), this means two things. Firstly, each
principle of justice must be satisfied in keeping with the order of nesting. Before all
else, therefore, basic needs must be met. Only when this principle has been satisfied
(ideally) can one move on to consider the recognition of individual merits. And then,
it is only when this recognition has become effective (again ideally), that it is
legitimate to eliminate the remaining inequalities. Secondly, a lexical order means
that the reduction in inequalities must be pursued without infringing the prior
principles of recognizing merits or meeting basic needs, and the recognition of
merits, in turn, must be pursued without infringing on the meeting of basic needs.
In passing, it is worth underlining what this result on lexical ordering entails for
the statistical methodology of the analysis of poll surveys. In this domain, the
purpose of most statistical tools is to analyse averages and variances and to compare
them between different groups. Now, as we have seen in the case of opinions  and
the same holds true for practices  other aspects deserve to be clarified. Over and
above the average and variance according to one or another social group, the
existence of a relation of order between different opinions (or practices), located with
the help of a Guttman scale, for example, constitutes a form of structuring that is
likely to be sociologically very significant. It is therefore surprising that this question
is so neglected today. In essence, it appears that researchers have taken note of the
difficulties inherent in judging absolute levels, and that intergroup comparison has
consequently established itself as the obligatory approach. But this approach must be
broadened, for if it is necessary to compare and contrast relative levels, there is no
reason why we should limit ourselves to the comparison of differences between social
groups. It is equally possible to investigate the differences in level within the opinions
(or practices) themselves, and to carry this investigation through to its conclusion by
seeking to determine whether they are structured by a specific relation of order.
Of course, not all researchers forget to look for an order of priorities. When it is
the case, they generally find such a structure. For example, using a completely
different set of data, Michelbach et al. (2003) showed that the principles of need,
equity, equality and efficiency are prioritized by interviewees in the USA.
In the present case, it is particularly important to note that Europeans adhere
massively to a lexical order for the criteria of distributive justice. By so doing, they
affirm a much more unified point of view than that pictured by most empirical
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studies of social justice, which generally content themselves with a simple
examination of the different criteria, leaving in shadow the nevertheless crucial
question of their compatibility. And yet, if justice was no more than a set of disparate
criteria and, ultimately, recipes to be applied in local situations, how could the very
concept of justice survive this diversity?
An ordering of priorities which respects procedural conditions
Many explanations (historical, psychological, etc.) can be found about this ordering
of priorities. We shall not here attempt to argue about them. However, according to
the epistemological orientation we are following, it remains for us to wonder why this
order is understandable, especially as long as it is in keeping with what one would
expect when applied justice is based on a unique and purely procedural foundation.
We must therefore carry out a critical examination of the relation between the matter
of European public reason and the form targeted by their opinion when it espouses a
nested order of criteria for applied distributive justice. In other words, it remains for
us to examine the extent to which the implementation of this ordering, during each
of its three stages, may result from a procedural condition which would be, each time,
none other than the condition of equal liberty (or any other equivalent expression).
Obviously, as we have seen, the first priority for Europeans in the matter of the
distribution of goods is to ensure that everyone’s basic needs are met (food, housing,
clothes, education, health). Rawls, for his part, speaks of the provision of primary
goods, by which he means a whole set of things, including basic liberties, representing
the minimum each person must have in order to exercise their freedom and pursue
reasonable life-plans. However, apart from a few subtle differences, these are two
expressions of the same idea. This is hardly surprising, because ultimately the aim
here is none other than to make effective the (solely procedural) principle of equal
liberty. To the extent that the members of a society must construct rules of collective
life that everyone can find reasonable, and bearing in mind the inescapable reality
that our very existence and margin of action depend on the possession of certain
goods, the universal satisfaction of basic needs can quickly be deduced.
As a matter of fact, the debate revolves not so much around whether the meeting
of basic needs is a priority as around the question of where the boundary should be
drawn between basic needs and superfluity, for the minimum needed obviously
depends on the society in question and on this society’s degree of complexity and
wealth. In other words, the debate revolves less around the principle than around its
extension. Rawls argues for maximizing the primary goods of the most deprived (the
maximin principle). Sen (1992) seeks to take into account not only the means but
also the extent of freedom. This, he contends, entails the maximization of
‘capabilities’, in other words what the primary goods, or resources in general,
actually make possible in terms of real capabilities or freedom to choose and
accomplish a plan of life. For example, it may often be necessary to give more of the
same good to a handicapped person if we wish for that person to enjoy the same
capabilities to accomplish a plan of life as a non-handicapped person. It is equally
possible to argue for a simple principle of minimum provision which maximizes
nothing, merely guaranteeing a certain set of basic goods. Thus, when we analysed a
representative poll limited to France (Forse´ and Parodi 2005), we observed that the
French, without really seeking to maximize a minimum level, appeared to determine
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its value by seeking a balance between a decent living level and a level still low
enough so that those being assisted would be unlikely to content themselves with this
minimum.
Once this first stage has been completed, we can move on to the second stage in
the implementation of the lexical order. Up until now, it has simply been a question
of recognizing the precariousness of living conditions and of the resulting capacities
for action and correcting this situation by meeting basic needs. Now we must
incorporate the fact that, through our actions, we also contribute to the production
of goods. Applying the principle of equal liberty means accepting that each person
should be able to pursue their reasonable life-plans. In most cases, the motivation for
these goals is a desire for the result (I grow strawberries so that I can eat them),
although this is not always the case (I paint a picture for the pleasure of painting, but
the end result may be of no interest to me). Consequently, in the case where the
project has been freely chosen out of desire for the result, one cannot entirely
dispossess an individual of the fruit of his or her efforts. And this is what makes the
recognition of merits, which emphasizes the obligation to pay an individual in
proportion to their input, an imperative.
Here again, as could be expected, the debate turns above all on the boundary
between what is and what is not merited, on the sharing of value-added between
taxpayers and the community or between workers and owners of capital, etc. The
European survey does not allow us to answer these questions, which are a matter for
delimited debates on specific, situated problems of justice. We can, on the other
hand, observe the consensus between European opinion and the theories of justice
ensuing from unanimous agreement.
Requiring (ideal) unanimous agreement is equivalent to acknowledging each
person’s right to veto, and therefore to equal liberty. There is no formal difference
between the two. Likewise, contravening the equality of opportunity, even before
coming down to a confrontation of talents, means preventing certain individuals
from really expressing them, in other words denying their right to veto. Once again,
from a strictly formal viewpoint, the equality of opportunity cannot be dissociated
from unanimous agreement (or from equal liberty). However, as we are dealing with
the reward of merit, it is more usual to see an indispensable procedural condition
from the perspective of equality of opportunity. There are good reasons for this, but
it should be emphasized that it is equivalent to respecting the procedure of
unanimous agreement or equal liberty. Of course, the fact that unanimous agreement
is an ideal procedure does not prevent it from involving real and strong effects.
In concrete terms, therefore, the principle of equity or merit is valid essentially
under the condition that the equality of opportunity is (sufficiently) respected. This is
why, for example, the winners of sports competitions are stripped of their medals
when they fail drug tests. It also explains why it is more than likely that sympathizers
of the extreme left will place real equality above merit, as we have observed, because
they have little or no faith in the equality of opportunity in our societies.
If we turn towards other sources of data, we can verify this hypothesis that the
recognition of merit is conditioned by the equality of opportunity from another
angle. The three questions in the EVS that interest us here were also asked in 2004
and 2005 in the DREES5 barometric survey (an annual opinion poll covering 4000
individuals representing, by quota, the French population aged 18 and over).
However, the wording of the criterion dealing with merit was changed significantly
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between 2004 and 2005 (see Tables 11 and 12). For the issue of meeting basic needs,
the wording remained unchanged and the replies are very similar from one year to
the next. For equality, the wording was slightly modified, the term ‘reduce
inequalities’ being replaced by ‘eliminate big inequalities’. This probably explains
the slight difference in the replies from one year to the next. About 5% of the French
consider it to be very important, for a society to be just, to reduce inequalities in
income, but only fairly important to eliminate big inequalities. On the whole, the
French believe that it is more important to tackle the situation of the greatest
number than to focus solely on the most extreme cases. From this perspective, the
small difference that can be observed between 2004 and 2005 is perfectly under-
standable. The wording of the question concerning merit, on the other hand,
changed much more drastically.
In 2005, the wording was identical to that of the 1999 EVS (the only slight
difference being that here there are only four choices of reply instead of five, which,
logically, concentrates the scores). We can observe the same hierarchy from need
through merit to equality. In 2004, the wording ‘Giving each person the opportunity
to succeed according to their merit and qualities’ is both stronger and more
heterogeneous. It involves more than just recognizing the merits of each person. A
(relative) equality of opportunity must also be attained. In other words, the
interviewees were asked to express their opinion on the importance of merit, subject
to the condition that everyone is given equal opportunity. Consequently, and as is
only to be expected, a great deal more importance was attached to merit (compared
with 2005, where no such condition of equal opportunity was stipulated). For the
reply ‘very important’, the score was 79.4%, compared with 59.1% in 2005, thus
Table 11. Criteria for a just society according to the DREES barometer poll in 2004 (in %).
Very
important
Fairly
important
Not very
important
Not at all
important
Guaranteeing that basic needs are met
for all: food, housing, clothes,
education, health
79.4 18.3 1.8 0.5
Giving each person the opportunity
to succeed according to their merit
and qualities
79.4 19.6 0.9 0.0
Reducing inequalities in income
between citizens
48.8 37.8 11.2 2.2
Table 12. Criteria for a just society according to the DREES barometer poll in 2005 (in %).
Very
important
Fairly
important
Not very
important
Not at all
important
Guaranteeing that basic needs are met
for all: food, housing, clothes,
education, health
79.9 18.3 1.3 0.6
Recognizing people on their merits 59.1 31.5 7.3 2.2
Eliminating big inequalities in income
between citizens
43.5 41.1 12.4 2.9
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attaining the same level of approval as the universal satisfaction of basic needs. There
is therefore no doubt that, at least for a large proportion of the French, the reward of
merit is conditional on the equality of opportunity.
Now, unlike merit, this equality is not a substantial criterion of justice. It is a
procedural condition. According to Rawls, it even comes within the domain of pure
or a priori procedure, because it represents one of the three fundamental principles of
social justice: whence his sharp criticism of all those who uphold the idea that merit
per se constitutes a criterion of justice. In fact, it is primordial and fundamental that
the procedure should be respected first. That one should subsequently deal with the
reward of merits may be empirically important, but it is essentially secondary and
remains open to debate, because we have to define merit, and, to do so, the procedure
of equal liberty must once again be respected, fundamentally and a priori. In short,
one can debate the question of whether or not the winner of a competition should be
awarded a medal, but one thing is certain, this debate will have no value in terms of
justice unless everyone has an equal opportunity to express their opinion. And if a
medal is decided on, it will have no value from the viewpoint of justice as fairness,
a priori and for the same reasons, unless every competitor enjoyed an equal
opportunity to make the most of their talents. At the very least, it must be accepted
that the principle of equal opportunity and the principle of merit are not on the same
level, that the former comes before the latter, and that the latter can only be
implemented if the former is respected. Once again, in good theory, there is an order.
And it turns out that this order is clearly perceived and endorsed by a large
proportion of public opinion. The theory in question is not unrealistic.
Now we can move on to the last stage in the implementation of the hierarchy of
principles. Once merits have been recognized, this last stage is intended to resolve any
remaining conflicts about the distribution of goods. How should we share out the
goods that we have not produced, but that have been given to us? How should we
share out the goods that we have not merited and that we do not need to lead a
decent life? Given that there is no longer any reason for distinguishing between
individuals on account of their needs or merit, there only remains (real) equality.
Once again, however, there remains room for interpretation, and this is where the
debate is centred. Firstly, it is quite obvious, by construction, that this debate on
equality echoes the debates on the delimitation of need and merit. Even more
importantly, the argument in favour of equality is still essentially formal, and leaves
open the possibility of drawing lots (subject to the equality of opportunity) to decide
on the winners and losers. Once again, the substantial question raised here (what
degree of real equality do Europeans support?) is linked to a question of procedure,
and once again, one may wonder to what extent the procedural principle of equal
liberty comes into play.
In this respect, we should begin by observing that Europeans could have
considered the meeting of basic needs and the recognition of merit to be sufficient for
the construction of a just society. But the level of importance they attach to equality
proves the opposite. Although it comes after the other two criteria, equality
nevertheless remains a priority. This tallies with the idea of a tendency towards
equality put forward by Rawls, according to whom this is the feature which
distinguishes democratic from meritocratic societies. While the latter look no further
than the meeting of needs and the recognition of merit, the former are far more
exacting; they mean to give full expression to the idea of equal liberty, in the sense,
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here, of equal dignity. It is no longer good enough to tell the disadvantaged that they
have got what they deserve. On the contrary, Rawls (1971, §17, p. 92) argues that: ‘the
confident sense of their own worth should be sought for the least favoured and this
limits the forms of hierarchy and the degrees of inequality that justice permits.’
Under these conditions, the reduction in real inequalities imposes itself as a priority.
The question then revolves entirely around the degree to which inequalities
should be reduced, and the least we can say is that this question has caused a lot of
ink to flow. Nevertheless, all the protagonists in this debate seek to justify their
positions by resorting (often implicitly) to the principle of equal liberty. For some, all
remaining inequalities are unjust because they contravene the equal liberty of the
most disadvantaged to choose and accomplish a plan of life; for others, this is only
true for certain inequalities, and for yet others it is not true at all. Moving beyond the
ideological confrontation to find the position of a fair spectator is obviously a
delicate task. One thing, at least, is certain. As this position is founded on a reflective
equilibrium, it must take into account an analysis of the facts, particularly the most
disadvantaged people’s sense of their own worth, despite their circumstances.
Conclusion
Finally, the four hypotheses we wished to verify through our analysis of the EVS have
been amply proved. Europeans did not content themselves with choosing one or two
out of the three criteria of distributive justice proposed. They emphasized the
importance of all three criteria (i). They did not oppose them against each other (ii).
On the contrary, they clearly organized them into a nested order (iii). Even more,
they showed remarkable constancy (iv), as social, national or opinion-based
divisions practically never altered this hierarchy, although these same divisions
often resulted in divergences in the interviewees’ evaluation of each of the criteria of
social justice involved most pronounced for the reduction of inequality, less for the
recognition of merits and even less for the guaranteeing of basic needs.
Thus, the choice between the two options that we presented at the beginning of
this article finds its resolution. The first option consisted in arguing from the premise
of incompatible or competing criteria to uphold a relativist perspective of essentially
local justice. But the main argument underpinning this approach has collapsed.
Certainly, the empirical data support the idea of a plurality of criteria. Above all,
however, they demonstrate that for European citizens, this plurality does not entail
any radical heterogeneity. The second option, adopting a Kantian approach in which
justice, built on a unique foundation, forms a whole, maintains that it should
therefore be possible to combine the different criteria of applied justice. From this
standpoint, Europeans show a distinct preference for a nested ordering of the
principles of distributive justice. A Kantian orientation is then much more
compatible with data than a relativist one.
Consequently, any public policy which, in the field of distributive justice, does
not aim to respect this ordering has little chance of being accepted by European
citizens. Admittedly, there may be divergences over the interpretation of the actual
situation (Wegener 1987) or over the best way to achieve this distributive justice.
There may be differences of opinion over the priority objective to be attained here
and now  certain people considering, for example, that merits are still under-
recompensed where others judge that the importance attached to merits already
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exceeds what the principle of equal dignity permits in terms of inequalities. The fact
remains that if, in the eyes of European citizens, a public policy clearly transgresses
the hierarchy of the three criteria of distributive justice, then they will condemn this
policy as unjust. In societies where the cohesion of the whole is at least partly
founded on the idea that a certain social justice must be respected or aimed at, the
result will be a weakening in this cohesion.
Notes
1. Without entering here into too much detail, it should also be remembered that fieldworks in
moral psychology (Piaget 1932, Kohlberg, 1981) showed that a relatively invariable
sequence (or order) of moral principles (from heteronomy to autonomy) is always observed
during childhood when justice is at stake.
2. The idea that a Kantian approach to social justice consists in an empirical theory of this
justice has recently been argued for in great detail (Forse´ 2006). Without returning to it
here, we should note that this is also Rawls’s opinion (1971, § 40, p. 227), as he himself
describes his theory of justice as an ‘empirical theory’. The very same phrase is also used by
Karl-Otto Apel (1998, p. 184). Although little attention has been paid to this aspect of the
theory up until now, it is methodologically essential.
3. Besides the weightings specific to each country, to calculate the European averages each
national sample has been weighted to take into account the demographic importance of the
population aged 15 and over in the corresponding country at the time of the survey (source:
Eurostat). This operation leaves unchanged the total number of individuals when all the
samples are added together.
4. This Guttman scale is also obtained through software performing a Boolean analysis of the
questionnaire (http://www.cmh.acsdm2.ens.fr/logiciels.php).
5. A research department of the French Ministry of Employment.
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